Political theorizing throughout the modern era uses the term "coercion" and its cognates (compulsion, force) in so many ways that one may despair of finding neat conceptual boundaries for it. Historically, as now, "coercion" appears to be a catch-all term, rather than one that clearly demarcates, say, acts of domination from acts of badgering or arm-twisting. Typically, however, it is used to capture a way that agents with considerable power can constrain the wills, actions, opportunities, bodies, and lives of others. Throughout this literature, coercion generally refers to the sort of power that states possess against their inhabitants, war victors hold over the vanquished, or even a church hierarchy holds over priests and laity, and husbands have sometimes wielded over their wives. These uses suggest a sort of irresistible power, which can operate through various mechanisms, including physical force and violence, threats, positional authority, and social pressure. Until relatively recently, few theorists paused to give a careful analysis of its meaning or conditions; more typically, they have taken for granted that the term is understood, and that the sort of power it invokes is evident when in use.
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There is an interesting story to be told about how the concept of coercion became a philosophical topic of its own. However, I will focus here on the slightly different, later story, of how in the course of philosophical investigation, theorists came to find and distinguish two kinds of coercion, and then to attend to one to the virtual exclusion of the other. In the process, I will offer some reasons for thinking that the bifurcation of this topic is significant, and in some ways problematic. After elaborating the distinction between the two kinds of coercion, I will show that the recognition of a categorical distinction in kinds of coercion is historically locatable. I will consider some of what can be said for and against the distinction, but I will be principally interested to trace how it entered, virtually unnoticed, into theorizing about coercion. I conclude by highlighting a few of the difficulties that arise if one does not attend to this history.
Contemporary philosophical writing on coercion as a special subject begins virtually from scratch with essays by Robert Nozick in 1969 and Harry Frankfurt in 1973, and a collection of essays on the subject in the NOMOS series, published in 1972.
1 These pieces, especially the ones by Nozick and Frankfurt, generated numerous responses and a discussion that continues today. While Nozick and Frankfurt both conceive of coercion principally as involving threats by one agent against another, Michael Bayles writes in the NOMOS volume that there are two kinds of activities to which the term "coercion" applies:
At least two kinds or varieties of coercion may be distinguished. In one type physical force is applied to cause behavior in another person. For example, one may clasp another's hand and force his finger to squeeze the trigger of a gun. Such "occurrent" coercion takes place infrequently…. In a second variety, dispositional coercion, one man (the agent) threatens another (the victim) with a sanction if the latter fails to act as requested. 2 While Bayles holds that the former, force-involving form of coercion is less common, interesting and important than the dispositional sort, he nonetheless thinks it falls within the bounds of the larger concept. Later writers, such as H. J. McCloskey, explicitly deny this:
I suggest that the core notion of coercion is that of power exercised by a determinate person, persons, or organizations(s), by the use of threats backed by sanctions in terms of evils to be imposed, benefits withdrawn or not conferred.
3
Responding to the view that some uses of force are also "coercion," McCloskey writes, When subjected to force, one does not act at all; rather one is acted upon; things are done to one or via one. … The person who is subject to force, the physical force of another, or to natural forces, has things happen to him. … By contrast, the coerced person acts. He does what he does as a result of coercion….
[H]e chooses to do it. 4 If McCloskey is right about this, then Bayles and a few like him are wrong about how to use the term "coercion." What McCloskey and Bayles apparently agree about, however, is that there is a kind of categorical difference of some importance between threatening to impose evils or to withdraw benefits, and the direct use of force to constrain activity.
In the literature on coercion since Nozick, McCloskey's association of the term "coercion" exclusively with the making of threats is clearly the majority view
